Does Competitive Sourcing Really Pay? by Friar, Allen
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Reports and Technical Reports All Technical Reports Collection
2007-04-01
Does Competitive Sourcing Really Pay?
Friar, Allen
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/33175
 Acquisition Research program 
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS & PUBLIC POLICY 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
 
Approved for public release, distribution unlimited. 
 
Prepared for: Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California 93943 
NPS-AM-07-020 
Does Competitive Sourcing Really Pay? 
Published: 30 April 2007 
by 
Allen Friar, DAU-S-CM 
4th Annual Acquisition Research Symposium  
of the Naval Postgraduate School: 
Acquisition Research:  
Creating Synergy for Informed Change 
May 16-17, 2007 
 
EXCERPT FROM THE 
PROCEEDINGS 
OF THE 
FOURTH ANNUAL ACQUISITION 
RESEARCH SYMPOSIUM  
WEDNESDAY SESSIONS 
 Acquisition Research program 
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS & PUBLIC POLICY 















The research presented at the symposium was supported by the Acquisition Chair of 
the Graduate School of Business & Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
 
 
To request Defense Acquisition Research or to become a research sponsor, 
please contact: 
 
NPS Acquisition Research Program 
Attn: James B. Greene, RADM, USN, (Ret)  
Acquisition Chair 
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
Naval Postgraduate School 
555 Dyer Road, Room 332 
Monterey, CA 93943-5103 
Tel: (831) 656-2092 
Fax: (831) 656-2253 
E-mail: jbgreene@nps.edu   
 
Copies of the Acquisition Sponsored Research Reports may be printed from our 





                  Acquisition Research: CREATING SYNERGY FOR INFORMED CHANGE      - i - 
 
Proceedings of the Annual Acquisition Research Program 
The following article is taken as an excerpt from the proceedings of the 
annual Acquisition Research Program.  This annual event showcases the research 
projects funded through the Acquisition Research Program at the Graduate School 
of Business and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Featuring keynote 
speakers, plenary panels, multiple panel sessions, a student research poster show 
and social events, the Annual Acquisition Research Symposium offers a candid 
environment where high-ranking Department of Defense (DoD) officials, industry 
officials, accomplished faculty and military students are encouraged to collaborate 
on finding applicable solutions to the challenges facing acquisition policies and 
processes within the DoD today.  By jointly and publicly questioning the norms of 
industry and academia, the resulting research benefits from myriad perspectives and 
collaborations which can identify better solutions and practices in acquisition, 
contract, financial, logistics and program management. 
For further information regarding the Acquisition Research Program, 
electronic copies of additional research, or to learn more about becoming a sponsor, 
please visit our program website at: 
www.acquistionresearch.org  
For further information on or to register for the next Acquisition Research 
Symposium during the third week of May, please visit our conference website at: 
www.researchsymposium.org  
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Executive Summary 
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76, Performance of 
Commercial Activities, has been around for over 40 years.  A-76 was commonly used to 
refer to the process of outsourcing non-inherently governmental jobs in the 1990’s.   The A-
76 circular was substantially revised to simplify and standardize implementation guidance 
and was released in its current form on May 29, 2003.  The OMB now uses A-76 to help 
implement the competitive sourcing initiative on President Bush’s Management Agenda.  
The stated policy objective in the revised circular is, “To ensure that the American people 
receive maximum value for their tax dollars, commercial activities should be subject to the 
forces of competition” (OMB, 2003, May 29).  The purpose of this study is to determine if A-
76 competitions have resulted in saving the taxpayers money.  More specifically, has A-76 
saved the Department of Defense (DoD) money over the long term?  
The thinking goes that by subjecting the non-inherently governmental jobs being 
performed by government employees to the “forces of competition,” the American taxpayer 
should benefit in the form of better service at lower cost.  As stated in the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR), “Commercial activities should be subjected to the forces of 
competition” (Part 7.302).  In this study, I will be primarily concerned with the lower cost 
expectation and some of the broader policy implications of this strategy.   
So the question is: have A-76 competitions saved the DoD money?  A General 
Accounting Office (GAO) report in 2000 on A-76 studies in the DoD concluded that the 
Department had saved $290 million dollars on 286 studies conducted from 1995 to 1999.  
However, the study goes on to say that there were some problems in the way the 
Government calculated baseline costs, which were often based on authorized positions 
rather than on actual positions, and that the cost-savings estimates did not include the costs 
of conducting the studies or the cost of implementing and managing them (GAO, 2000).  In 
other words, true cost savings must consider the costs of conducting the studies and the 
costs of administering the contracts or otherwise monitoring performance.  It was also, 
“noted that the level of savings will be difficult to track in the long term because workload 
requirements change, affecting program costs and the baseline from which savings are 
calculated” (2000).  
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A more recent study conducted by the IBM Center for The Business of Government 
found that competition results in significant savings.  This study examined competitions 
conducted from 1994 though the first quarter of 2004 and used the DoD’s own data-
collection system to conclude that there was, “an average estimated savings of 44 percent 
of baseline costs, for a total savings of $11.2 billion” (Gansler & Lucyshyn, 2004, October, p. 
28, 32).  The study also found that although there were relatively few government civilian 
employees involuntarily separated, most of the savings associated with the competitions 
came as a result of reducing the number of positions by 24,852 (2004, October).  The 
number of positions was reduced regardless of who won the competition—the government 
or a contractor.  The savings estimate was also based on estimated cost and did not 
consider the cost of conducting the study or administering the contracts. 
In another report (GAO-04-367), the GAO indicates that although the DoD has 
achieved savings though competitive sourcing, it is difficult to estimate precisely the amount 
of these savings (2004).  Further, the Office says significant challenges face the agencies 
implementing competitive sourcing, including: difficulty in identifying non-inherently 
governmental positions for competition, a constantly changing environment, insufficient staff 
to plan and carryout the competitions and a lack of funding to implement and administer the 
program (2004).    
In a widely publicized White Paper, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
looked at 217 competitive sourcing studies conducted in FY 2004 and estimated these 
studies would “generate a net savings,” or cost avoidance of $1.4 billion over three to five 
years (2005, January).  They claim that the data suggests the savings are primarily because 
of larger competitions and more frequent use of standard competitions that require in-house 
teams to come up with a most efficient organization.  Put another way, “competition drives 
bid prices down and efficiencies up” (2005, January).  It remains to be seen whether or not 
this will remain true over the life of the contracts. 
An interesting study by David Galley (2002), an adjunct faculty member at George 
Washington University, examined the impact of public-private competitions on the costs of 
providing maintenance and repair services for buildings on 104 Army installations from 1989 
to 1999.  He says that the study, “shows conclusively that the impact of those A-76 
competitions on costs depended on the category of the winner” (pp. 3-18).  If the private 
sector won, there was significant cost savings; but if the work was kept in-house, there was 
not (2002).  One offered explanation for this was that the Army did not monitor the in-house 
work force’s performance like it did when a contractor was involved.  
A study at the US Air Force Academy examined five different studies conducted 
during FY 2001 to 2003 which resulted in significantly reducing the number of employees 
performing competitive sourcing functions.  However, a survey of employees and managers 
familiar with the competitive sourcing programs indicated that 80% felt the services were 
worse than before the studies had been done and only about half thought the program 
saved money for the Air Force (Green, Heppard & Forrester, 2004, pp. 4-11).  In one 
conclusion, this study also indicated that, “Estimates used to compute savings omit many 
costs, e.g., study costs, retraining costs, loss of productivity, severances packages, etc.” 
(2004).  
In a briefing paper entitled Show Me The Money, Max Sawicky of the Economic 
Policy Institute investigated the evidence presented by the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) in support of the Revised A-76 Circular that purported to show that A-76 
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competitions saved money.  One of the studies cited in this paper was conducted at the 
Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) and involved 16 competitions for 2,800 jobs.  His findings 
indicated that in every case, the “observed cost” (or the actual cost of performance) 
exceeded the bid price.  The “effective cost” (the actual cost taking into consideration the 
change in the scope of work) exceeded the bid price in nine out of fourteen cases (Sawicky, 
2003).   An interesting observation in this study was that even if there are apparent savings, 
they are not returned to the taxpayer.  In effect, competitions are really a vehicle for 
expanded government because, “agency savings do not translate into budget savings” 
(2003, p. 8, 12).       
In light of these and other studies on outsourcing in the DoD, it is interesting that a 
recent article in the Federal Times asserts that according to a Pentagon official, “it’s unclear 
if the military always saves money when it contracts with private companies to perform 
support services.”  Claude Bolton, assistant secretary of the Army for acquisition, logistics 
and technology, is quoted as saying that, “While it may be clear that a particular contract will 
save millions of dollars right away, there is no simple way to determine if that remains true 
four or five years down the road” (as cited in Lubold, 2006, p. 13).  In other words, estimated 
savings at the beginning may not translate into actual savings in the end.   
 “Ah, there’s the rub.”  Federal employees unions and others have been making this 
case for years.  Testifying before Congress, the president of the American Federation of 
Government Employees, Bobby Harnage (2001, March 15), indicated that even as the 
number of federal government employees in the DoD steadily decreased by over 280,000 
from 1992 to 1999, the cost of service contracts increased from $39.9 billion to $51.8 billion 
(p. 1).   In the DoD, service contracts are now the largest segment of DoD procurements and 
make up over 50% of all contract dollars awarded (Lubold, 2006, April 24, p. 13).  In fact, 
according to a recent congressional report, spending on federal contracts has been the 
fastest growing part of the discretionary budget for the last five years, and service contracts 
are leading the way (US House, 2006).  As anyone familiar with the federal budget can tell 
you, the budget has not gone down regardless of how many jobs are contracted out or how 
many activities are turned over to contractors.  In the DoD, budgets have increased almost 
every year since 1994, and they are not expected to go down anytime soon (OMB, 2005).  
So, does outsourcing or competitive sourcing really save the taxpayer money?  It 
may save money on some contracts, but there is a question about whether the government 
customer is getting the same or better service.  Also, projected savings and actual savings 
are two entirely different things.  The comptroller general of the United States, David Walker, 
was quoted recently as saying, “they (contractors) often fail to deliver the promised 
efficiency and savings.  Private companies cannot be expected to look out for taxpayers’ 
interests” (as cited in Shane, 2007, February 4).  Generally, it does not appear A-76 is 
saving the taxpayer money overall.  As pointed out above, the federal budget is not 
decreasing, in spite of the hundreds of thousands of jobs that have been contracted out.  
Both Congress and the Executive branch like to tell voters they are cutting the bureaucracy, 
but in reality they are merely transferring government functions to private contractors.  This 
growing “shadow workforce” has been identified by many writers, but Paul Light of the 
Brookings Institute has been a leader in this area; he has an excellent book on the subject 
entitled The True Size of Government, in which he concludes, “the true size of the 
government is much larger than the federal employee headcount suggests” (1999, p. 44).     
There is an old saying in Washington that, “there are two kinds of contractors, those 
with government contracts and those that want government contracts.”  The fact that the 
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federal government is the largest purchaser of goods and services in the world makes it a 
very attractive customer.  The implication that by subjecting non-inherently governmental 
jobs to the forces of competition somehow captures market efficiencies is on its face 
plausible; but on closer examination, this implication may be more apparent than real.  First, 
as stated by Professor Dan Guttman of Johns Hopkins University in a recent article, 
although, “we associate the utility of contractors with the notion that the private sector brings 
market forces to bear on government activities, this is only true where a commercial market 
exists for the government purchases” (2004, p. 24).  He goes on to say, “where government 
is the primary or predominant purchaser of services or goods the picture is less clear” 
(2004). As has been demonstrated by Peck and Sherer (1962) in their classic analysis of 
weapon system procurement, markets are difficult to duplicate in a governmental setting 
primarily because the government entity really doesn’t have any market competition for 
many of the products they buy.  As they point out, the government is often the only buyer (p. 
60).  This rational can also be applied to services the government purchases.  For instance, 
typically the work (services) is to be performed on a government installation; the work will be 
performed during certain hours, and the work is controlled by a performance work statement 
or statement of work with some type of government monitoring.  The services may even be 
performed in a combat environment.  This is not exactly “market conditions.”   
Secondly, as has been asked by others and included in Dan Guttman’s article, “In 
what respect is a contractor that earns nearly 100% of its income from doing government 
work engaged in a commercial activity?” (2004, p. 29, quoting from the “Bell Report”).  Third, 
if the government can manage its organization better by creating a “most efficient 
organization,” why isn’t it doing so already?—because, as has been shown (See IBMCBG 
study cited above), most of the alleged savings comes from reducing the number of 
employees. Fourth, the whole debate about what is inherently governmental varies from 
time to time and place to place.  There is conflicting guidance from agencies on what is 
inherently governmental, and some of it even seems to be in conflict with the Federal 
Acquisition Regulations.  And finally, social and economic policies like equal employment 
opportunity, veteran’s preference, providing jobs for the handicapped and disabled, health 
insurance and retirement benefits for employees are now discounted in the name of 
competition.  Is this really what “competitive sourcing” is supposed to be about?   
Competitive sourcing (or, as it used to be called, “commercial activities”) is about 
private-sector contractors doing commercial work.  This should not be that hard to define.  
Like Lt. General Donald Hoffman, military deputy in the office of the assistant secretary of 
the Air Force said, “We don’t need Air Force plumbers and Air Force electricians when right 
outside the gate there is a contractor to do that stuff” (as cited in Lubold, 2006, p. 13).  I 
think he is right.  Those are excellent examples of commercial activities.  But simply 
because some contractors want more government work, and some government officials 
want to give it to them (for a variety of reasons), that still doesn’t make almost everything the 
government does a commercial activity.  It is high time that the public and their elected 
representatives recognize that reducing the size of government is about more than 
eliminating federal employees before it’s too late.  In fact, a good first step might be for 
congress to take the recommendation of their own analysts and, “further prescribe that 
certain government activities are to be considered inherently governmental” (Grasso, 2003, 
October 20, p. 23).  This would remove the arbitrary discretion of understaffed agencies 
looking for a way to outsource their work, and perhaps save us from ourselves, while making 
sure all the agencies use the same criteria when determining what jobs are to be 
outsourced. 
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Although it may be unpopular to say that the government has a higher calling than 
the purely monetary incentive of business to make a profit, it is nevertheless true.  The 
government typically has a mission to accomplish, and it may not be financially feasible from 
a business point of view.  When this is the case, why should taxpayers be expected to not 
only pay for the service but to also pay a profit?  This is especially true when the services 
being performed are not really commercial services.  For competitive sourcing to really work, 
the first step must be, as Professor Steven Schooner has indicated, “to determine which 
functions are inherently governmental and which are not” (2004, p. 295).  It should not be 
that difficult to identify a commercial service or activity.  Then, “the government should begin 
outsourcing those services that are most readily available in the private sector” (2004, p. 
296).  This is the only way the government can truly benefit from “market forces.”  To try to 
compete jobs that are not typically performed in the private sector is not in the public interest 
and will not save the taxpayer money in the long run.   
Beyond the cost savings or cost avoidance that may or may not be associated with 
competitive sourcing, there is the question of what is in the best interest of the government 
and the public.  On this point, an outsourcing survey conducted by Deloitte Consulting 
Corporation of 25 world class organizations found that, “outsourcing is an extraordinarily 
complex process and the anticipated benefits often fail to materialize” (2005, April, pp. 3-4).  
Further, they say, “In the long run, organizations that continue to outsource will experience a 
loss of bargaining power to vendors as the supply side consolidates” (2005, April).  Both of 
these phenomena have occurred in the Defense industry in over the past 20 years and, “it is 
unlikely that the defense industry will ever approximate a competitive market” (Driessnack & 
King, 2004, January-April).  As the supply side continues to consolidate domestically and 
internationally, is it really in our national interest to contract out more and more government 
activities?  Perhaps the debate we should be having is what is in our national best interest 
from the taxpayer’s point of view—because as we have seen, the cost of government is not 
going down.           
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